Minor Interpellation of the Member of the Bundestag Andrej Hunko and further Members and of the Left Party parliamentary group.

Security cooperation with Egypt and Tunisia

Bundestag printed paper 18/2719

Preliminary remarks of the questioners

The European Union (EU) had already come to an agreement with Tunisia in 2013 that it would support the government in "reforming the security sector" (Question Time at the German Bundestag, 20 March 2013). To this end a group of "experts" travelled to Tunisia to take stock of the situation. After this, the consultations were planned on specific measures. The Federal Government also concluded a "transformation partnership in support of the democratisation process" with Tunisia. The cooperation began with training measures by the Federal Police "in the area of airports and maritime security"; the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office) conducted workshops on "crime-scene investigation", "drugs-related crime", Internet analysis and personal security. While the Ben Ali government was still in power, the Federal Ministry of the Interior supplied Tunisia with the IBM police analysis software "i2 Analyst's Notebook". The German domestic secret service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), provided advice to Tunisian partner authorities on 'counterterrorism'. According to information from the Federal Government, since spring 2012 a cooperation project has existed "at the request of Tunisia" on "intelligence services in democratic states governed by the rule of law". The Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences is in charge of this, although the German foreign secret service - the Bundesnachrichtendienst - is also involved. The German Länder (federal states) are also helping Tunisia with cooperation projects. Hesse and the Federal Criminal Police Office provided training on policing at demonstrations and football matches.

In Tunisia, but also in Egypt, the Bundeskriminalamt carried out courses on police Internet analysis (Bundestag printed paper 17/12971). The measures were officially directed at combatting "terrorism". In the view of the questioners, however, this is a political and malleable term. The knowledge imparted by the BKA may also have been used to suppress digital dissent. Inter alia, the skills may also have helped in the persecution of unwelcome football fans, whose websites were to be placed under surveillance following a decision by the Ministry of the Interior (Egypt Independent, 14 March 2013). Journalists, too, and the political opposition in general, including the "Muslim Brothers", are being persecuted and in some cases brutally killed (for instance during the alleged attempted escape from a prisoner convoy, AFP, 20 August 2013).

Recently it became known that the Egyptian police is still using public sources on the Internet to track down, humiliate, abuse and lock-up homosexuals (www.cairoscope.com, 31 August 2014). Digital activists have long since faced a high degree of risk in Egypt. Military and police repression
culminated in the murder of the blogger Khaled Mohammed Said, who died after being severely tortured. It is unclear to what extent the German course "Open Source Internet Analysis" helped the since disbanded state security service in arresting the well-known blogger. Numerous other bloggers have been detained and face serious charges.

In spite of this, the Federal Government negotiated an agreement on police cooperation with Egypt (Bundestag printed paper 17/14474). The stated aim is "improving cooperation on combating, preventing and prosecuting criminal offences in the field of organised and serious crime, terrorism and in the field of technical support in disaster relief and in the event of serious accidents". According to statements made by the Federal Government, the "Egyptian side" has already submitted "counterproposals" to a German draft (Bundestag printed paper 17/14577). In light of the situation having become "unstable" however, the Federal Government wanted to "therefore closely evaluate the political situation in Egypt prior to the conclusion of an agreement". The Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, it was stated, had since sought to clarify certain terms. According to a more recent answer from the Federal Government, this did not lead to the negotiations on the agreement being suspended, however (Bundestag printed paper 18/226). With Tunisia, too, a "comparable" security agreement was said to be under negotiation. The conclusion of such agreements, it was stated, was necessary "in order to bolster and further develop the cooperation with these countries in the field of police, customs and security".

Under the heading "Euromed Police III", the EU is also funding security cooperation projects with Egypt and Tunisia (http://www.euromedpolice3.eu). The aims include combatting "cybercrime and new criminal threats" and detecting unusual financial flows. "Euromed Police" is meant to align the police authorities of the states addressed more closely with the structures of the EU and its Member States. This also includes the police agency EUROPOL. The entire project is aimed at members of the police forces, quasi-military gendarmeries, special units and financial investigations and departments specialised in computer crime.

1. For what reason does the Federal Government currently deem it to be necessary to "bolster and further develop" the cooperation with Egypt and Tunisia in the field of policing, customs and security?

On 1.

Due to its geographical position between the crisis flashpoints of Libya, Gaza and the direct border to Israel, Egypt attracts radical Islamists. With the current lack of Libyan border controls, weapons circulating freely in Libya are being transported to Sinai and being deployed there both against the Egyptian security forces and Israel. As the attack in Taba in February 2014 illustrates, the terrorists in Sinai have no qualms about attacking Western tourists in the country either. Extremist groups in Egypt are now partly adopting the approach of IS (Islamic State) and are publishing videos showing the decapitation of alleged Israeli spies in Egypt. The bloody attack in North Sinai against military personnel on 24 October 2014 shows how determined and capable terrorist groups in Sinai are.

Tunisia faces multifaceted challenges in the scope of its democratisation process; a result of its geostrategic position and the instabilities following the "Arab Spring". In the mountain region
on the border to Algeria, terrorists from Algeria have joined forces with Tunisian Ansar al-Sharia extremists to carry out attacks above all against state representatives and armed and security forces. Libya is now a largely lawless country in which terrorists groups and weapons are to be found in abundance, in particular also threatening Tunisia, which is barely able defend its long desert border. A disproportionately high number of IS volunteers comes from Tunisia, who in part exit and enter the country via Libya, where they are also trained in part. Tunisian extremists, among others, plan attacks in Tunisia from Libyan soil, which can also be directed against Western interests. The failed attacks in Sousse and Monastir on 30 October 2013 (inter alia against tourist targets) attest to these dangers. It is precisely the comparatively successful democratisation process and the many Western interests/targets on the ground there that make Tunisia a preferred target for potential extremist attacks.

2. What current European Union endeavours relating to Egypt and Tunisia to support the governments in "reforming the security sector" or similar measures for police forces, secret services or customs authorities are known to the Federal Government?

On 2.

The Federal Government knows that the European Union (EU) intends to carry out a project on the issue of combatting terrorism in the Maghreb/North Africa region as of 2016 in the scope of the stability instrument (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)). The Federal Government is not aware of the exact contents or beneficiary countries. A Danish consortium is currently conducting a study on the development of the project. Please also refer to the answer to question 39.

3. When did or when will the EU initiatives begin to the knowledge of the Federal Government and which authorities from which countries will be taking part assuming which tasks?

On 3.

Please refer to the answer to question 2.

4. What other EU projects are to be launched in 2014 or 2015 to the knowledge of the Federal Government and which authorities from which countries will be taking part assuming which tasks?

On 4.

Please refer to the answer to question 2. The Federal Government has no information beyond this.

5. In the scope of which projects is the Federal Government currently active in Tunisia as part of a "transformation partnership in support of the democratisation process"?

On 5.

In the scope of the German-Tunisian Transformation Partnership (TP), the Federal Government is currently active with numerous projects in the areas of democratisation, building a constitutional state, decentralisation and vocational training. This year the focal point was above all the elections conducted in Tunisia.

6. To what extent is this transformation partnership also addressing the security sector and which
authorities are concerned here?

On 6.
In the context of TP, three initiatives are currently being funded in the field of security sector reform in cooperation with the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern - BMI). The Federal Police is supporting the Tunisian border authorities in the area of coast guarding, maritime security, maritime search and rescue, border control and document security. The Federal Criminal Police Office is training sniffer dogs to detect explosives and 2,700 protective vests were supplied for use by the police and National Guard inside the country.

7. What major reasons can the Federal Government cite for the need to “improve the cooperation on combating, preventing and prosecuting criminal offences from the field of organised and serious crime, terrorism and in the field of technical support in disaster relief or in the event of serious accidents” with regard to the government in Tunisia?

On 7.
In the view of the Federal Government, there is a need to support the Tunisian security authorities in their development towards becoming authorities which work professionally and are subject to the rule of law. As one of Europe's neighbours, Tunisia is of strategic significance in combating cross-border crime. This holds particularly true of the offences in the remit of the criminal police relating to international Islamic terrorism, vehicle crime and human smuggling. The main objective in improving cooperation in the area of technical support in disaster relief or in the event of serious accidents is to help countries help themselves.

8. To what extent is it true that a security agreement is also being negotiated with Tunisia, what is the content thereof, when was a draft submitted to which authorities and how did they react to this?

On 8.
The agreement negotiated by the Federal Government between the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of the Tunisian Republic on cooperation in the field of security contains provisions on cooperation on combatting serious and organised crime and terrorism and on cooperation in the area of migration and disaster relief.

The security agreement will be presented to the Bundestag for ratification upon conclusion of the negotiations.

9. In the view of the Federal Government, what shape might operational cooperation with Tunisia “by means of coordinated police measures with the help of staff/material support” take (Bundestag printed paper 17/14577)?

On 9.
The provision in the draft of the security agreement concerns cooperation in the scope of specific investigative procedures. The type and scale of cooperation have to be defined separately in each case.

10. Which training and further training measures or any other forms of cooperation (including
informal dialogue) have been conducted since 2013 with which Tunisian authorities by the Federal Police, the Bundeskriminalamt, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service and which others are planned?

On 10.

Federal Police (BPOL) and Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)

With regard to the cooperation formats between BPOL and BKA and the Tunisian authorities please refer to the quarterly interpellations of the Left Party parliamentary group on police and customs missions abroad (BT printed papers 17/13209, 17/14453, 18/154, 18/676, 18/1321, 18/2286, 18/0000 (Answer to MI 18/2838)). Training activities conducted by the Federal Police are for the benefit of the Tunisian National Guard or the Tunisian Border Police. The BKA activities in the area of training support are for the benefit of the Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale (DGSN).

Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is not conducting training and further training measures in the meaning of the interpellation for Tunisian authorities. Cooperation takes place solely on a case-by-case basis in the scope of its statutory mandate.

Federal Intelligence Service (BND)

On 15 und 16 May 2013 the seminar "Intelligence services in democratic states governed by the rule of law – legitimacy, organisation and oversight" was conducted in Tunis under the leadership of the Tunisian Minister of State for Governance and Counter-Corruption. The German delegation comprised members of the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences from the government and federal intelligence departments. On the Tunisian side, there were representatives from the government and administration and participants from public life and the media.

For reasons of public good it is not possible to answer question 10 in full publicly. The information concerned has to be subject to secrecy in order to protect the cooperation between the German intelligence service and foreign intelligence services. Publically announcing information on cooperation with foreign partner services and enabling unauthorised parties to gain access to this information as a result would lead to significant negative impacts on the trust-based cooperation. Cooperation on the condition of confidentiality is the basic premise for all forms of cooperation amongst intelligence services. In addition to the cooperation itself this includes information on how the cooperation is structured specifically as well as information on the capabilities of other intelligence services. Information on the type and scale of the exchange of information with foreign intelligence services may also enable conclusions to be drawn on reconnaissance activities and focal points of the Federal Intelligence Service's work. It would also entail the risk that direct conclusions could be drawn on the working modes, methods and the level of knowledge of the foreign intelligence services. Due to the aforementioned considerations, answering the question publically would be damaging to the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. For this reason, the answer to this question is partly classified as "confidential" under the Regulation on the Safeguarding of Classified
Information (VSA).

11. What is or was the content of the measures on police Internet analysis and "intelligence services in democratic states governed by the rule of law"?

On 11.

As reported in BT printed paper 17/12981, the Federal Criminal Police Office conducted one course each in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010 on the topic of "Open source Internet analysis in the field of international terrorism". The courses were identical in content and in addition to dealing with the organisation of security authorities and cooperation forums for counterterrorism in Germany, covered basic possibilities and methods of Internet research and the use of publically available software and Internet services.

In the "Intelligence services in democratic states governed by the rule of law" project, the focus was the constitutional reform of the Tunisian intelligence services and the ensuing bolstering of legal certainty in administrative enforcement.

12. What was the content of workshops in Tunisia in the field of "border police evaluation and analysis" and "counterterrorism" and which authorities from both sides took part in them?

On 12.

The Federal Government has no knowledge of a course on "border police evaluation and analysis" in Tunisia.

The Bundeskriminalamt conducted a course for DGSN on the subject of "counterterrorism", covering the following contents:

- German security authorities, German investigative/criminal proceedings;
- Local situation;
- Radicalisation/de-radicalisation;
- Telecommunications surveillance;
- Questioning on the basis of rule-of-law principles;
- Observation and other audio and visual surveillance;
- Terrorism on the Internet;
- Keeping of official records;
- Data processing;
- Investigative procedure following major incidents.

13. What tasks did the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences assume in the "Intelligence services in democratic states governed by the rule of law" project?

On 13.

The BND department of the Faculty of Intelligence Services at the Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences conducted various information seminars in the project cited; the focus was the aspect of the "democratic legal system".
14. **What knowledge does the Federal Government have of further measures on the part of the riot police of the Länder in Tunisia, when did they take place or when are they due to take place and which Tunisian authorities are being addressed?**

On 14.
The Federal Government has no knowledge of further measures by the riot police of the Länder in Tunisia.

15. **What projects is the Federal Government currently pursuing in the context of security cooperation with Egypt?**

On 15.
No support measures are currently being carried out in the area of the policing.

16. **Which training and further training measures or other forms of cooperation (including informal dialogue) have been conducted since 2013 by the Federal Police, the Bundeskriminalamt, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service with which Egyptian authorities and which others are planned?**

On 16.
**Federal Police (BPOL) and Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)**
The Federal Police is currently planning to conduct training sessions in the field of combatting document fraud accompanied by simultaneous equipment aid to support the training. The Bundeskriminalamt conducted an information-gathering visit from 7 to 14 June 2013. Please also refer to the answer to question 17.

**Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)**
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is not carrying out training and further training measures in the meaning of the interpellation with the Egyptian authorities. Cooperation takes place solely on a case-by-case basis in the scope of its statutory mandate.

**Federal Intelligence Service (BND)**
It is not possible to provide a fully public answer to question 16. Please refer to the comments to question 10 for the grounds for this.

17. **What is or was the content of the measures and who were they addressed at?**

On 17.
**Federal Police (BPOL) and the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)**
In the context of the information-gathering visit by the Bundeskriminalamt it was solely informational interviews with individuals or Egyptian authorities that were conducted, without generating subsequent future measures to support police force building. In the scope of the information-gathering visit, interviews were conducted with the representatives of the following agencies:

- Military intelligence (DMT – military intelligence service)
- Criminal police
- National Security Sector (NSS)
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• Hostage Rescue Force (HRF)
• Central Security Forces (CSF)

In addition to this, an exchange took place with former presidential aide Dr Essam HADDAD and former president of the police academy Dr Ahmed MANSOUR.

Please also refer to the answer to question 16.

Federal Intelligence Service (BND)

It is not possible to provide a fully public answer to question 17. Please refer to the comments to question 10 for the grounds for this.

18. What knowledge does the Federal Government have of further measures by the riot police of the Länder in Egypt, when did they take place or when are they due to take place and which Egyptian authorities are being addressed?

On 18.

The Federal Government has no knowledge of further measures by the riot police of the Länder in Egypt.

19. To what extent did Federal authorities engage in an exchange with Egyptian authorities in 2013 or 2014 on the phenomenon of "black bloc" or "ultras" and which authorities from both sides took part in this in what way?

On 19.

Federal authorities did not engage in an exchange with Egyptian authorities in 2013 or in 2014 on the phenomenon of "black bloc" or "ultras".

20. What is the current state of the negotiations on an agreement on police cooperation with Egypt?

On 20.

The negotiations have not yet been completed.

21. When were the negotiations suspended and resumed and which reasons were cited to the Egyptian government in each case?

On 21.

The Federal Government shall refrain from providing further information on the negotiation process in light of the negotiations still being underway.

22. Which major reasons can the government cite for the need to "improve cooperation on combatting, preventing and prosecuting criminal offences in the field of organised and serious crime, terrorism and in the field of technical support in disaster relief or in the event of serious accidents" with regard to the government in Egypt?

On 22.

Egypt does not have the necessary equipment to successfully master the special challenges posed by the fight against terrorism. The security forces are still in a learning and adaptation process. This is clear not only in light of the many attacks on police and military control points,
not just in Sinai (for instance in Farafra on 19 July 2014 around 300 km south-west of Cairo in which 20 soldiers lost their lives) but also against the backdrop of the terrible attack on Egyptian soldiers on 24 October 2014. Poor training and equipment as well as a lack of knowledge regarding the possible actions that can be taken and principles for acting in accordance with the rule of law are often causes for acting incorrectly, which can be contained by improving cooperation.

23. In the view of the Federal Government what shape could operational cooperation with Egypt "by means of coordinated police measures with the help of staffing/material support" take (Bundestag printed paper 17/14577)?

On 23.

Please refer to the answer to question 9.

24. What did the “counterproposals” to the German proposal for an agreement submitted by the Egyptian side consist of and how did the Federal Government react to them?

25. Which "certain terms" had the Egyptian government sought to clarify?

26. What is the Federal Government's current position on concluding the agreement and to what extent will it “therefore closely evaluate the political situation in Egypt prior to concluding an agreement”?


Please refer to the answer to question 21.

27. To what extent has the Federal Government also addressed the persecution of bloggers and activists critical of the government in the context of expanding its cooperation with Egypt and how did the authorities in question react in each case?

On 27.

The Federal Government talks regularly about human rights cases with the Egyptian government in the scope of bilateral political and diplomatic contacts, including cases of persecuted bloggers and activists.

28. What knowledge does the Federal Government have of whether the skills taught by its authorities on investigating activities on the Internet are being used by Egyptian authorities to persecute homosexuals or dissidents?

On 28.

The Federal Government has no information on this.

29. In light of the fact that the Federal Government states that in its "training sessions, seminars and observations" the participants were always "taught to safeguard human rights, act according to the rule of law and the full judicial verifiability of every police action", what conclusions does it draw from these obviously continuing to be disrespected by the Egyptian police?

On 29.

Federal Government measures are subject to evaluation. This includes continuously reviewing whether knowledge imparted or technology provided in the framework of equipment aid is
used in the beneficiary country in line with the defined purpose and the principles of the rule of law.

If there is known abuse of the imparted knowledge, or of the equipment made available, a re-evaluation is conducted with regard to the provision of future support, which can lead to certain measures being suspended.

30. To the knowledge of the Federal Government or based on information from the Council Working Groups or other European Union bodies, which countries intend to join forces in the maritime border surveillance system “SEAHORSE Mediterraneo”?

On 30.

Germany is not involved in the project group. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, the project group has been closed. In the future, cooperation is to take place in the scope of the European border surveillance network EUROSUR. The conclusions of the Council of the European Union of 10 October 2014 on "Taking action to better manage migratory flows" emphasize among other things the need to cooperate with the countries of North Africa on the "Seahorse Mediterraneo" network. Please also refer to the answer of the Federal Government on 7 January 2014 to question 35 of the Minor Interpellation submitted by the Left Party parliamentary group in BT printed paper 18/254, to the answer of the Federal Government on 14 May 2013 to question 11 of the Minor Interpellation of the Left Party parliamentary group in BT printed paper 17/13462 and to the answer of the Federal Government on 28 December 2012 on questions 10 to 15 of the Minor Interpellation of the Left Party parliamentary group in BT printed paper 17/11986. The Federal Government has no further information on this.

31. What more recent information does the Federal Government have on the extent to which Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt also wish to participate in "SEAHORSE Mediterraneo" and intend to create "coordination centres" or comparable institutions for this purpose (Bundestag printed paper 18/254)?

On 31.

Please refer to the answer to question 30.

32. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, when were which staff members of the EU policing mission EUBAM Libya evacuated to Tunisia and at precisely which locations are they working (Bundestag printed paper 18/2466)?

On 32.

The members of EUBAM Libya last still working in Tripoli were relocated to Tunis on 31 July 2014. The German policewoman there had already been evacuated by land via Tunisia on 16 July 2014. Another German policeman was on home leave at the time the EU mission was evacuated. Both police enforcement officers have been performing their work for the mission from Germany since the evacuation. From 4 to 10 October 2014, the German head of the Border Police and Immigration Unit of EUBAM Libya is supporting the EU mission EUCAP (EU Capacity Building Mission) Sahel Niger in the framework of a field visit. The purpose of the field visit is to improve cooperation between the Libyan and Nigerian border authorities.
33. Which maritime, air and land borders of Libya are currently outside of government control to the knowledge of the Federal Government, and what impacts does the military state of emergency of certain provinces have on the situation in Tunisia?

On 33.
There is no state monopoly on the use of force in Libya currently. The land, air and maritime borders are therefore for the most part outside of government control. The military state of emergency in some provinces is not having any recognisable impacts on Tunisia in the view of the Federal Government.

34. To what extent does the Federal Government now have further information "beyond the general level of knowledge in the media" on an agreement between Libya, Tunisia and Algeria of 8 January 2013 on common border controls and according technical up-scaling (Bundestag printed paper 18/2466)?

On 34.
The Federal Government has no information beyond that of media coverage.

35. What knowledge does the Federal Government have of the extent to which boats that were used as a means of escape across the Mediterranean were taken back to the countries of origin upon reaching the European coast to be used again for transporting those who had fled and what conclusions does it draw from this?

On 35.
To the knowledge of the Federal Government, it was only from Egypt that boats were deployed that were used multiple times. The Federal Government has no further information.

36. What knowledge does the Federal Government have on the extent to which the "5+5 countries" (five Maghreb states and Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta) have also agreed on more recent measures to "combat transnational terrorism and organised crime" or to prevent unwelcome migration from Tunisia or Egypt?

On 36.
The Federal Government has no information on this.

37. What knowledge does the Federal Government have on further training measures in the scope of the "Euromed Police III" EU project and which events have taken place since 2013 in Tunisia and Egypt under whose leadership and addressed at whom?

On 37.
Please refer to the preliminary remarks of the Federal Government in the answer to the Minor Interpellation of the Left Party parliamentary group in BT printed paper 17/13185 on 2 April 2013 on the issue of "training in countries of the Arab Spring on new investigative techniques, internet surveillance and telecommunications tapping".

38. What knowledge does the Federal Government have of a continuation or new edition of "Euromed Police" and which events are to take place in Tunisia and Egypt under whose leadership and addressed at which groups?
On 38.
The Federal Government has no information on this.

39. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, which other projects have been or are being funded in Tunisia and Egypt through the EU "Instrument for Stability" programme?

On 39.
To the knowledge of the Federal Government, since 2007 two measures in Tunisia and two measures in Egypt have been funded through the EU Instrument for Stability (IfS; since 2014: "Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace" (lcSP)).

**Tunisia:**

2011:
IfS Exceptional Assistance Measure: "Support to Democratic Transition" with two components: 1.) Measure supporting and bolstering the incorporation of civil society in the transitional process, 2.) Technical support for transitional government institutions and assistance with the election of a Constituent Assembly and future election process as well as supporting the broader political reform process.

2012:
IfS Exceptional Assistance Measure: "Support to Internal Political Dialogue"; setting up a forum enabling an inclusive dialogue on key areas and challenges of the democratic transition process.

**Egypt:**

2011:
IfS Exceptional Assistance Measure: "Support to Democratic Transition"; two components: 1.) Capacity building for civil society organisations on legal reforms and implementation of public awareness raising measures; 2.) Provision of capacities for analysis and reporting on planned and adopted legal acts and their impacts on democratic governance.

Furthermore, one lcSP measure is currently being carried out in Egypt, which serves to provide advice for democratic transition (lcSP Exceptional Assistance Measure "Policy Advice for Democratic Transition"). The project is designed to cover the whole of 2014 and is being carried out by the EU delegation in cooperation with the non-governmental organisation "IDEA" ("International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance", based in Sweden). It encompasses the following elements: reform of electoral law; parliamentary elections; reform of parliamentary law-making), the required funds total €500,000.

In addition to this, to the knowledge of the Federal Government, the EU is preparing two longer-term regional projects through the long-term components of the lcSP, which are also to involve Egypt and Tunisia: penal reform in the area of counterterror legislation in cooperation with the Malta International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law and a project on aviation security.

Please also refer to the answer to question 2.

40. What knowledge does the Federal Government have of endeavours related to motivating North-African governments to get involved or cooperate with regard to the EU operation "Triton" in the Mediterranean under the leadership of the EU border agency Frontex?
On 40.

Please refer to the answer of the Federal Government to question 15 of the Minor Interpellation of the Left Party parliamentary group in BT printed paper 18/2923 of 14 October 2014.

41. To the knowledge of the Federal Government, when did consultations on this take place with Egypt, Tunisia and/or Libya?

42. Which authorities from all participating countries or from the EU have taken part in the consultations to the knowledge of the Federal Government?

43. What results did the consultations produce, which agreements were concluded or which counterproposals did the North-African countries table?

On 41, 42, 43.

Please refer to the answer to question 40.