Libya is to become the first third-state to join the EU’s satellite-supported “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. The Italian military is currently setting up the necessary control centres, to be followed by a new application for a search and rescue zone, supported by Italy. In the end, the Libyan coastguard is to coordinate all maritime search and rescue missions itself.
Shortly after Muammar Gaddafi‘s fall from power in 2011, the European Union attempted to incorporate Libyan border surveillance into European systems. Just one year later, rebels in the first post-revolution government signed a declaration with the intention of establishing maritime situation centres in the capital Tripoli and in Benghazi. The Libyan coastguard, which is part of the military, was to be linked with the Mediterranean Border Cooperation Centre (MEBOCC) in Rome. Libyan border guards would then have been provided with information from the European states bordering the Mediterranean in real time, in order to prevent refugees from crossing to Italy and Malta.
Tunisian border authorities are receiving equipment and training assistance from the German Bundeswehr and the Border Police in the course of a number of projects. Existing measures are now being extended. Manufacturers of surveillance technology stand to benefit.
By Matthias Monroy
The Federal Government is helping Tunisia pursue the ongoing development of an electronic border surveillance system. A section that has already been constructed is now being extended along the Libyan border to the border town of Borj El Khadra in the Sahara. This was disclosed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior in response to a minor interpellation. The overall project is being planned together with the US Government. The intended recipient of this “training initiative” is the Tunisian military.
The American Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has been tasked with the concrete implementation of these measures. Costs of extending the installations are not known. The financial aid received from Germany is explained vaguely as being “in the tens of millions”.
“The support for Libyan militias in the framework of the EUNAVFOR MED military operation is helping them in the brutal persecution of refugees. It has nothing whatsoever to do with training in sea rescue. This is proved by the answer received from the German Federal Foreign Office regarding an incident on 6 November, in which the crew of a Libyan patrol boat once again caused the death of a number of people. Eight of the thirteen crew members had previously been trained in the framework of EUNAVFOR MED”, stated Andrej Hunko, European policy spokesman for the Left Party parliamentary group in the German Bundestag.
Voice samples can be analysed in order to identify unknown persons in tapped telephone conversations, audio chats and video files. If the technology were applied to internet nodes, then it would be of particular interest to intelligence services.
By Matthias Monroy
The Speaker Identification Integrated Project (SIIP) on the use of speech biometrics by the police, co-financed by the European Union (EU), has successfully passed its final test. This was announced by the international police organisation Interpol in a press release. SIIP’s objective is to identify and locate “criminals and terrorists” through the analysis of their voices.
Opening speech of Andrej Hunko in the current affairs debate of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on "The need for a political solution to the crisis in Catalonia" on 12th October 2017. The debate was proposed by the Unified European Left (UEL) group. A video of the whole debate in English is available here. The verbatim records can be found here.
As a significant precursor to a “European Defence Union”, the EU Treaties provide for an instrument known as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). This military union enables a group of EU Member States to cooperate more closely in the matter of security and defence policy. In return for this, they enter into binding commitments to, for example, increase their defence spending and integrate their security and defence policy. The German Government is one of the driving forces in seeking to advance a military core Europe through PESCO. At the Foreign Affairs Council on 11 December, Permanent Structured Cooperation is to be formally established through a Council Decision.
“Most of the Member States of the European Union permit their police to use rubber and plastic ammunition. Switzerland and Turkey also use such ammunition. Time and again rubber bullets are used to fire into crowds of people, causing serious injuries. Although prohibited, the police target people’s heads. As a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I am taking the events of this nature that took place in Barcelona as grounds to call for this type of ammunition to be outlawed Europe-wide”, declared Andrej Hunko, Member of the German Bundestag.
Avrupa Konseyi’nin Türkiye’deki seçimleri izleme heyetine katılımımdan sonra AKP taraftarları, şahsıma karşı başlatmış oldukları gayrimeşrulaştırma kampanyası ile beni PKK sempatizanı olarak karalamaya çalışmaktadırlar. Türkiye’de son aylarda gerçekleşen kitlesel tutuklama ve işten çıkarılmalar da aynı yöntemle gerekçelendirilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda açıklama yapanlardan biri, Dışişleri Bakanı Mevlüt Çavuloğlu’dur. Halbuki kendisi, Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenterler Meclisi eski üyesi olarak Konsey’in PKK’yı terör örgütü olarak değerlendirmediğini bilmektedir.
The German secret service is since 1 July 2016 cooperating with other secret services in The Hague. The various services operate a joint file (CTG database) on an “operative platform” and also second liaison officers.
This “operative platform” belongs to the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), founded in 2001, of what is known as the Club de Berne, an informal alliance of an undisclosed number of secret services of the EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland. This cooperation is currently limited to the field of “Islamist terrorism”. The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) has been tasked with the logistical implementation of this “joint file”.
The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s involvement in the CTG database is governed by the hastily adopted extension of Sections 22b and 22c of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution, an amendment which came in for heavy criticism. These provisions allow the German national secret service to establish joint files with foreign partner services, provided that the cooperation or the activities undertaken in this regard are of substantial security interest for the Federal Republic of Germany and the respective participating state.
First of all, how do you evaluate the crisis between Turkey and Germany?
The relations have cooled down in the last weeks. But only because the Turkish Governments’ statements have reached a level that makes it hard take them serious. Until now, the Merkel Government has relied on its Turkish partners in the light of the anti-immigration deal. This has led to a mutual dependence which resulted in the fact, that the German Government didn’t criticize the Turkish Government at all, accepting that way the massive and undemocratic persecution of the Turkish opposition, media, academics, and others. We have criticized the Merkel Government for that cronyism with the dictatorship-to-be. We also condemn Erdoğan’s plans for a constitutional reform and the persecution. I hope that the people in Turkey will vote NO in the referendum.